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INTRODUCTION
Catastrophic terrorism1 has incited headlines, 60 Minutes reports,
Presidential addresses, and popular fiction. A most dire threat comes
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. "Catastrophic terrorism" is an intentionally undefined term, reflecting the fact that terror-
ists who aspire to inflict catastrophic injuries have a long menu of options to employ, and reflecting
the conclusion that debates over whether a particular technology is or is not within this category are,
essentially, inconclusive. The definition of "catastrophic terrorism," as opposed to conventional
terrorism, turns less on what type of device is used than on the magnitude of the effects. Conven-
tional terrorism, plane hijacking, kidnapping, or bombing with conventional explosives causes
casualties in the hundreds and does not lead to a wide-scale disruption of commonplace affairs,
even within the locale of the event. By contrast, catastrophic terrorism would be capable of, and
typically would be intended to, cause casualties in the thousands (or tens of thousands) or cause an
extraordinary suspension of civilized order. In general, "catastrophic terrorism" should include the
use, by individuals or sub-national groups, of nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weap-
ons. Also included should be conventional explosions of nuclear power plants or chemical facilities
which release toxic substances over a wide area. Moreover, the term should include various types of
cyber-terrorism that cause the breakdown of essential infrastructure such as communications,
banking, or air traffic control. See generally Ashton Carter, John Deutch, & Philip Zelikow, Cata-
strophic Terrorism; Tackling the New Danger, WASH. Q., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 80. See also, Walter
Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism, FoREIGN AFFAIS, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 32; and William J. Broad,
Sowing Death: How Japan Germ Terror Alerted World, N. Y. TmEs, May 26, 1998, at 1.
2. Indeed, the furor over catastrophic terrorism has prompted a counter-reaction of skepti-
cism alleging that the threat has been over-stated and that the response is disproportionate. See
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from trans-national criminal organizations whose motives are altogether
distinguishable from those of States.3 These organizations would not
consider overt war, and deterrence is meaningless. These organizations
are seeking to amass pecuniary or political capital, and catastrophic
weapons may substantially augment those plans.
The time has come to move beyond howls of alarm to a public dis-
cussion of what policies should be adopted or reformed. That discussion
should proceed even as crucial questions remain only partially answer-
able: How realistic is the possibility of catastrophic terrorism? How
easy is it to make a catastrophic device that actually works? Why would
any person or group want to kill hundreds, thousands, or tens of thou-
sands of innocent victims?
These questions do not have empirical answers, and some skepti-
cism should attend assertions that risks of catastrophic terrorism may be
measurable. Assessing risk is difficult because catastrophic terrorism is
a low probability threat which, if it occurs, could have exceptionally
high casualties. Yet, four points can be offered without serious contra-
diction. First, technical obstacles to catastrophic terrorism will decline
with time. The capabilities for producing lethal devices will spread, and
the choke points of human activity will become more concentrated,
thereby unfortunately converging the ability to make a lethal weapon
with an ability to use it to devastating effect. The necessary ramification
is that whatever the technological barriers to accomplishing an act of
catastrophic terrorism may or may not be, those barriers will be over-
come, sooner or later. Even if the risks are not now realistic, they will
be.
Second, after a catastrophic terrorist event actually occurs, legal is-
sues such as protecting civil liberties and constitutional rights may
likely be ignored, at least temporarily. Thus, the costs of a catastrophic
event must be measured not only in loss of life and property but also in
the probable disruption and constriction of due process of law.4 This
assertion directly leads to point three: the costs of a disorganized re-
sponse to a catastrophic event, in money and in jeopardy to our civil
liberties, are likely to exceed overwhelmingly the costs of preventing an
event or, if necessary, of executing a well-planned effort to mitigate and
remedy the harm done. America will be well-served by careful legal
planning, in advance, which appreciates catastrophic terrorism's risks,
generally Peter Pringle, Terrorism: America's Newest War Game, THE NATION, November
9, 1998, at 11.
3. See generally John M. Deutch, Terrorism; The Possibility of the Use of More So-
phisticated Weapons, FOREIGN POLICY, September 27, 1997, at 10.
4. See generally Michael Eisenstadt, Enhancing Public Preparedness for Chemical
and Biological Terrorism, POLICYWATCH, April 3, 1998.
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outlines options to prevent such events while recognizing the legal
complexities of that task, and organizes responses in a manner respect-
ful of the rule of law.5
Fourth, lawyers have a crucial role, not to hold a grand debate over
a single over-arching question, but to clarify and strengthen the legal
rules pertaining to preventing catastrophic terrorism, or, if prevention
fails, responding. to a terrible event. By joining the planning process,
lawyers can focus policy analysis so as to harmonize the pursuit of secu-
rity with the preservation of civil liberties. Inquiry should focus on five
issues: (1) Which parts of government can exercise how much authority,
and what limits apply to that authority? (2) What should be the mili-
tary's role in responding to terrorist events? (3) What regulatory
controls of materials and technologies may deny access to weapons ca-
pabilities? (4) How can the international community, through treaty-
making, cooperatively address catastrophic terrorist threats? and (5)
How might the private sector cooperate in counter-terrorism, and what
protective boundaries should be established for individual privacy and
property rights?
I. ORGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Senior government officials, including the President, have often
warned about the catastrophic terrorism threat, but is the federal gov-
ernment optimally organized to detect and prevent catastrophic terrorist
activities? Two somewhat converse issues arise in this context because
Americans want to be protected without sacrificing liberty: (1) Are the
many relevant agencies of the federal government coordinating their
efforts efficiently in order to maximize protection, detection, investiga-
tion, and remediation capabilities? and (2) Are appropriate controls in
place to forestall over-reaching of authority?
According to recent analyses, current governmental efforts are
largely uncoordinated. Relevant federal and state regulators, law en-
forcement, intelligence, emergency preparedness and management,
defense and other communities formulate policies to defend against and
5. As a recent analysis of bioterrorism concluded: The development of a clearly ar-
ticulated, comprehensive strategy to defend against bioterrorism must be based on an
accurate threat assessment, prudent allocation of resources, and respect for the-rule of law. If
properly implemented and sustained, this approach could help deter terrorists and sponsors
of state terrorism who otherwise would consider biological attacks. Conversely, the percep-
tion that the United States is poorly prepared to cope with bioterrorism is likely to encourage
groups to exploit this strategic vulnerability. James H. Anderson, Ph.D., Microbes and Mass
Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACK-
GROUNDER, May 28, 1998, at No. 1182.
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respond to threats, but they do so virtually independently. Vital infor-
mation is not currently shared between government sectors in ways that
promote a more complete understanding of catastrophic terrorist risks.6
Until 1998, the Department of State coordinated the federal gov-
ernment's international anti-terrorism efforts,7 reflecting a supposition
that terrorism was a "foreign" phenomenon best addressed through
diplomatic channels. The World Trade Center and Oklahoma City
bombings shattered that supposition, and increasing notoriety of hate
groups focused law enforcement attention on domestic terrorism risks.
Moreover, at the bureaucratic level, having the State Department in
charge meant that there could be confusion among agencies as to who
had primary responsibility over certain issues and situations. Clearly,
the Attorney General has authority, as the nation's chief law enforce-
ment officer, over any required federal response to domestic terrorism.
Elements of the response may require support of the defense, emer-
gency response, intelligence and diplomatic agencies, as well as other
agencies within government. Yet under the previous system, FBI activi-
ties, obviously the foundation of any domestic anti-terrorism effort,8
were subject to the authority of the Attorney General while the State
Department, a co-equal part of the Executive Branch which was viewed
as having less familiarity with the requirements of domestic crime
fighting, had policy coordination responsibilities.
Another potential quandary for State Department supervision con-
cerned counter-terrorism's need for rapid and systematic information-
sharing among myriad agencies: the Departments of State, Treasury,
6. Id.
7. See Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 (1995).
8. The FBI is the lead agency for combating domestic terrorism and a key supporting
agency for combating international terrorism. From fiscal years 1995 to 1998, FBI counter-
terrorism resources more than doubled, increasing from about $256 million in FY 1995 to
about $581 million in FY 1998. In total, from 1995 to July 31, 1998, the FBI had allocated
an estimated $1.6 billion to carry out its counter-terrorism mission; about $609 million is
allocated for the FBI's counterterrorism mission in FY 1999. See GAO Report, Combating
Terrorism-FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FY's
1995-98), GAO/GGD 99-7, (1998). The FBI's "counterterrorism" activities include: (1)
Preventive and crisis management efforts to detect and investigate terrorism against U.S.
persons and property, both in the United Sates and abroad; (2) Forensic and other support
functions, and (3) Leadership of joint terrorism task forces and participation in interagency
working groups. The FBI manages standing Joint Terrorism Task Forces in 18 cities to fa-
cilitate exchanges of intelligence and coordinate activities among law enforcement
personnel. The FBI is a member of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism that
enhances the processing, analysis, and distribution of foreign intelligence information by
sharing information on the terrorist activities and assessing indications of terrorist threats.
See Legal Foundations, The Federal Legal Landscape, Report 2 of 12, Report to the Presi-




Energy, and Defense, as well as the FBI and FEMA. Moreover, counter-
terrorism uniquely requires interaction between domestic law enforce-
ment and international intelligence, and there is a clear need to have
required planning capabilities and response authorities available directly
to the White House. Placing the State Department between and above
the CIA (and other intelligence agencies) and the FBI, and between
those agencies and the White House, suggests a less-than-optimal order.
Moreover, information-sharing must be coordinated between the entire
federal government and state and local governments. Thus, there should
be an official in charge of combatting terrorism that is above any spe-
cific Executive agency capable or coordinating the federal government's
efforts to work uniformly with other nations as well as with state and
local governments.
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton announced Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 62, establishing the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism within the National
Security Council.9 Richard Clarke was named the first National Coordi-
nator with responsibility to create a "new and systematic approach to
fighting the terrorist threat of the next century."' Elevating coordination
to the NSC clearly enables resolution of many potential problems. As
National Coordinator, Clarke has the final word to resolve inter-agency
confusion or conflict on an instance-by-instance basis; elevating coordi-
nation to the NSC reduces the risk of inappropriately meshing different
types of governmental activity having different scopes of authority."
PDD-62 establishes a comprehensive strategy for military prepared-
ness and response, allocating $300 million for chemical-biological
defense, and $100 million to provide diagnostic, detection, and protec-
tive equipment to local and state agencies. The primary component of
this strategy is enhanced communication and coordination among fed-
eral and local government as well as international organizations and
foreign governments. Clarke has implemented a four-part program: (1)
coordinating local agencies; (2) coordinating federal agencies; (3) de-
tecting and intercepting the flow of weapons and equipment that may be
9. See Presidential Decision Directive No. 62 (1998) (visited March 30,
1999);<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-62.htm>.
10. Id.
11. On the same day, the President announced PDD-63, Presidential Decision Directive
No. 63 (1998) (visited March 30, 1999) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd-63.htm>.,
which focuses on enhancing the nation's capability to protect the security and reliability of
critical infrastructures. PDD No. 63 defines critical infrastructures as those physical and
cyber-based systems that are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a trau-
matic or debilitating impact on the United States. These systems generally include electrical
power, gas and oil, telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, vital govern-
ment operations, emergency services, and water supply systems.
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used by terrorist groups; and (4) disrupting terrorist organizations.
Clarke also announced that the government reserves the right to use first
strikes in self-defense against terrorist groups.
It may be reasonable to presume that these recent changes are re-
sponsive to concerns over the government's capability to coordinate its
activities to prevent catastrophic terrorism and to respond if prevention
fails. However, serious questions have to be asked about converse con-
cerns: the risk of over-reaching of authority. The new National
Coordinator is more an administrator than an advisor, with responsibil-
ity to assign roles to 18 federal departments and agencies, including the
FBI, CIA, and the Pentagon, and to coordinate the law enforcement ef-
forts of state and local governments. This responsibility includes
authority to allocate tasks among governmental agencies and to super-
vise their budget requests with regard to counter-terrorism. 2
The NSC was created in 1947 to be the President's chief advisory
group on matters of international security; its role is to prepare policies
to address foreign threats. Despite its role as a White House foreign
policy advisory office, unfortunately, the NSC has a history of having
exceeded legal limitations on its mandate. Moreover, the NSC is subject
to only minimal congressional or judicial oversight." The predominant
check on the NSC is Presidential oversight. In the domain of foreign
affairs, the President's authority is greatest, and doctrines of executive
privilege are significant; by contrast, legal concerns over civil liberties
are somewhat attenuated. There is a concern here that the NSC might
intrude on constitutional rights and civil liberties of Americans, and that
such intrusion would not be subject to accountability. Iran-Contra sug-
gests that a more elaborate set of legal rules may be appropriate. No
aspersions need be cast at Richard Clarke to be concerned that a new
Administration might appoint a new National Coordinator who recog-
nizes the absence of limitations on his/her authority and who takes
advantage of the public trust.
II. ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN RESPONDING
To TERRORIST EVENTS
Perhaps no issue regarding catastrophic terrorism has raised as
much heated controversy as the role of the military and the CIA. In fact,
there is not one issue here but many issues intertwined. On these mat-
12. See Philip Gold, Limitations of the NSC, WASH. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at A19.
13. For a general discussion of pertinent issues, see Jay S. Bybee, Advising the Presi-




ters, the focus should be more normative than descriptive; that is, with
regard to catastrophic terrorism, it is less significant what are the rules
pertaining to involvement with domestic law enforcement than what
those rules should be if an unparalleled cataclysm occurs in America. It
may be that, for a variety of reasons, reforms should be propounded to
enable the military and the CIA to become more actively involved in
specific law enforcement activities. In the context of catastrophic ter-
rorism, involvement of the military and/or the CIA may be the best way
to forestall rampant chaos and protect individual rights and property.
The legality of the military's role in carrying out domestic missions
has, of course, been extensively litigated and discussed. The Posse
Comitatus Act prohibits the military from executing the role of law en-
forcement; military personnel may not "execute the laws."' 4 Four
questions are relevant to application of that prohibition. First, is the ac-
tivity directed at foreign or domestic threats? Traditionally, terrorism
has been viewed as a foreign threat, but, as discussed above, that view
has given way to a new understanding in recent years. A second ques-
tion is whether the threat, even if domestic, is a crime or is a matter of
national security concern. The problem is to define terrorist activity as
either a national security threat or crime. Significantly, threats to critical
infrastructure are considered national security threats: 5 The third ques-
tion is whether the military activity is in response to an emergency or
does the context allow for a deliberate law enforcement response; the
military can act in response to an emergency. 6 Furthermore, immediate
action by military commanders may be allowed when serious conditions
resulting from a civil emergency may require action to save lives, to
prevent human suffering or to mitigate great property damage, and time
does not permit prior approval from higher authorities.
The fourth question-arises only if the activity is in response to a
criminal threat: is the military acting to assist law enforcement or has it
taken the lead role? The military may provide passive assistance that is
"merely incidental."' 7 Yet, the military may provide intelligence gath-
ered during normal operations to federal, state and local law
14. United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1999).
15. See generally M.E. Bowman, The Military Role in Meeting the Threat of Domestic
Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 209 (1990).
16. The Disaster Relief section of the U.S.C.A., provides for the assistance of federal
agencies to local authorities in the event of natural or man-made emergencies. 42 U.S.C.A
§ 5121 (1999). This section requires a request to the President for assistance, through FEMA,
and a finding that the event is a bona fide emergency. See generally Jim Winthrop, The
Oklahoma City Bombing: Immediate Response Authority and Other Military Assistance to
Civil Authority (MACA), ARMY LAW., July 1997, at 3.
17. People v. Burden, 411 Mich. 56, 303 N.W.2d 444, 447 (1981).
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enforcement officials. 8 The military may also furnish equipment for law
enforcement use and may provide for that equipment's maintenance and
repair. 9 The military may provide training and advising to law enforce-
ment officials.20 Finally, military personnel may be used to supplement
law enforcement effort at the request of heads of agencies responsible
for enforcing federal drug laws, immigration laws, and customs laws.'
There are difficulties in applying these standards in the context of
catastrophic terrorism because of jurisdictional challenges which are
further complicated by the fact that we may not know the source of an
attack--domestic or foreign. We may not know the identity or motives
of the attacker-individual or group, terrorist, criminal, or government.
Nor may we initially know the magnitude of the attack. We may not
even know if ours is the only nation experiencing the attack. Can we
even pretend to distinguish between a foreign or a domestic threat when
the attacker is using the Internet to electronically dismantle key infra-
structure sectors?
22
At the prevention stage, it would seem to be illegal to use the mili-
tary to infiltrate subversive organizations or to conduct domestic
surveillance, but it would seem within the scope of the military's
authority to help state and local law enforcement officials as well as
private industry to apply systems defense measures. Training, expert
advice, operating and maintaining equipment, and transfer of informa-
tion are not within the Posse Comitatus prohibition. Also permitted are
other actions that do not subject civilians to the use of military power
that is regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory. A significant role for the
military will be in protecting borders and monitoring customs opera-
tions.
Intelligence-gathering raises unique issues. Seemingly not contro-
versial would be gathering intelligence about foreign terrorist activities,
but gathering intelligence on foreign-sponsored terrorist activities
within the United States is more ambiguous. The CIA does not have
police, subpoena, law enforcement, or internal security powers. How-
ever, a recent amendment to the National Security Act allows the
Intelligence Community to collect information abroad about non-U.S.
persons in order to support a U.S. law enforcement or counterintelli-
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 371(a)(1994). [A's text] This may include operational intelligence
such as movements of air and sea traffic, or evidence gathered during criminal investigations
conducted within military jurisdiction.
19. See 10 U.S.C. § 372 (1997).
20. 10 U.S.C. § 373 (1994).
21. 10 U.S.C. § 374 (1994).
22. See generally Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyber-
space, 32 INT'L LAW. 1167 (1998).
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gence investigation upon request of a U.S. law enforcement agency.23 If
the investigation or gathering of intelligence and counterintelligence is
to take place within the United States, the CIA efforts must be coordi-
nated with the FBI. It is worth considering whether the demands of
international exchanges of information and mutual legal cooperation
suggest an enhanced role for the U.S. intelligence community, and, if
so, how that community's activities should be coordinated with domes-
tic law enforcement agencies." Some experts have recently proposed
establishment of a new National Terrorism Intelligence Center to deal
with these issues.25
After a catastrophic terrorist event, the military's role would be de-
cidedly greater. No serious controversy attends the deployment of
expert military teams, trained to detect and cope with chemical or bio-
logical agents, to respond to a terrorist event, and to help minimize loss
of life. Nor does serious controversy attend deployment of Army Corps
of Engineers to work with only Federal authorities (e.g. FEMA) to re-
pair infrastructure and alleviate property damage.
The military's role in maintaining civil order if a catastrophic ter-
rorist event were to occur with thousands or even tens of thousands of
casualties may be so crucial that doctrines such as posse comitatus may
diminish to trifling concerns. If government agencies are totally inca-
pacitated by a terrorist event, the military may step in to provide all
government services, including law enforcement, without waiting for
specific authorization or instructions from the seat of the government.
The military is authorized to aid law enforcement in cases of sudden and
unexpected invasion, insurrection, or riot that endangers the public
property of the U.S., or in cases of attempted or threatened robbery or
interruption of the U.S. mails, or other equal emergency so imminent as
to prohibit communication. The protection of life and property in the
23. Executive Order No. 12333 specifies the scope of the intelligence activities in which
the CIA may engage and limits those activities to the gathering of "foreign intelligence"
(information relating to the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organi-
zations or persons) and "counterintelligence" (information gathered and activities conducted
to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations con-
ducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons). Exec. Order No. 12333,
1981 Pub. Papers 1128 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1996). For a discussion of the
CIA's Counterterrorist Center, see Vernon Loeb, Where the CIA Wages Its New World War;
Counterterrorist Center Makes Many Arrests, Pursues Bin Laden With Aid of FBI, NSA,
WASH. POST, September 9, 1998, at At.
24. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation included in the Department of Defense
Authorization for 1997 sets out a comprehensive plan for dealing with terrorist threats from
WMD. President's Report on Government Capabilities to Respond to Terrorist Incidents
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 256 (Feb. 26, 1997).
25. Ashton Carter, John Deutch, & Philip Zelikow, Catastrophic Terrorism; Tackling
the New Danger, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 80.
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wake of a catastrophic terrorist event may require the search and seizure
of private property without warrants, arrest and detention, and tempo-
rary deprivation of fundamental rights. In any event, there would be few
legal remedies for abuses committed by military personnel under these
circumstances.
The most difficult issues pertain to investigating responsibility for
an event and apprehending suspects. No responsible assertion has been
made that the military or CIA should take control of investigating and
apprehending domestic criminal suspects. The FBI has the authority to
investigate all crimes against the U.S. It is the lead agency in all crimes
for which it has concurrent or primary jurisdiction and which involve
terrorist activities. The FBI has developed plans to deal with unconven-
tional crisis situations including a Nuclear Terrorism Response Plan, a
Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan, the Critical Response
Group, and the Hostage Rescue Team. Section 1416 of the 1997 Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act26 permits the Secretary of Defense to
provide assistance to the Department of Justice in emergency situations
involving a biological or chemical weapon. While the statute prohibits
the direct participation of military personnel in most cases, it authorizes
direct participation in arrest, search and seizure, and intelligence collec-
tion when necessary to save human life and civilian authorities are
unable to take the required action, as long as the action is otherwise
authorized by law.
The Disaster Relief Act27 authorizes the federal government to pro-
vide an orderly and continuing means of assistance to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suf-
fering and damage which result from disasters. Then, through the state
and local agencies, assistance may be available to private concerns. In
terms of direct aid, the Stafford Act provides funding and other assis-
tance authority only to public entities and facilities and private nonprofit
facilities. Accordingly, the Federal Response Plan establishes a frame-
work for mobilizing a coordinated response to catastrophes. The
Terrorism Annex has recently been added to the FRP to address inci-
dents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The authority of
the military to engage in key asset protection operations has been judi-
cially upheld. Moreover, the military has a recognized role in disaster
relief operations, including: battling fires, building levees to protect
against flood waters, providing emergency electricity, assisting rescue
operations, and debris removal.
26. See 10 U.S.C.A § 382 (1994).
27. See 42 U.S.C.A §§ 5121-5204 (1999).
28. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 59 U.S. 115 (1951).
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The military's authority would seem, therefore, to be sufficient to
address most responsibilities that would befall it in the event of a cata-
strophic terrorist event. The issue is, however, whether that authority
could be abused. Clearly, the military is differently trained than domes-
tic law enforcement officials with implications for the use of force and
for the collection of evidence. In an emergency, involvement of the
military in maintaining order, sifting through evidence, and helping ap-
prehend culprits could lead to an overreaching of authority, and perhaps
a hasty threat to liberty. 9 This possibility is compounded by the coordi-
nating role of the National Security Council, discussed above, which is
even less constrained against overreaching. In the chaos that would fol-
low a catastrophe, might the National Security Council authorize
military activity that would intrude on American's civil liberties and
even on their basic rights to life and liberty? Certainly the risk is im-
probable, but just as certainly there appear to be few significant legal
protections against such a risk and virtually no means of accountability.
Any potential problems concerning the role of the military and the
CIA regarding catastrophic terrorism should be worked out in advance
and which in a manner which anticipates as many contingencies as pos-
sible. Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of
Justice and the CIA or Department of Defense, separately or with the
NSC, should analyze both the myriad types of attacks as well as the dis-
tinct phases of involvement, specifying as precisely as possible the
respective roles of military and intelligence and providing for a clear
transfer of authority as the crisis passes through various stages from the
initial emergency to the post-crisis and investigative stages. Since the
military's most crucial counter-terrorism role would seem to be in the
immediate aftermath of terrorist events, what is meant by an emergency
should be circumscribed and the point at which law enforcement agen-
cies should assume authority over situations involving terrorist events
should be defined. To the maximum extent consistent with national se-
curity concerns, MOUs should be shared with Congress, state and local
officials, and the public; if an event occurs, responsible people through-
out all sectors of society should know the hierarchy of authority and the
rules of engagement.
29. See Matthew Carlton Hammond, Note: The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in
Need of Renewal, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 953, 953 (1997).
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III. CONTROL OF PRECURSORS-DENIAL OF ACCESS
To WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
A second set of questions may be addressed to the sufficiency and
efficiency of legal regulation of weapons agents and their precursors
under domestic law. What legal impediments might complicate a ter-
rorist's ability to produce catastrophic agents? Are monitoring systems
in place that raise the likelihood of detecting clandestine production?
Are storage systems for such agents securely protected against theft?
Can these agents be acquired or is acquisition dependent on legal per-
mission which would, at minimum, provide an ability to trace large-
scale purchases? Are systems in place to limit the transportation of sig-
nificant quantities of dangerous agents?
The regulatory regime applicable to nuclear materials should serve
as a model. The entire process of making fissile materials, from mining
uranium to processing that ore into fuel, is regulated by federal law.
Any attempt to develop a productive capability without proper licenses
is manifestly illegal and should trigger a variety of government over-
sight measures. Creation of a clandestine uranium enrichment facility or
a chemical reprocessing plant to recover plutonium from spent fuel
would be certainly illegal and virtually impossible. Storage of nuclear
materials is extensively regulated, and beating security systems would
unquestionably invoke a massive law enforcement response. Possession
or acquisition of nuclear materials without a license is illegal, without
regard to how the accused intends to use those materials. Finally, trans-
portation of nuclear materials is subject to strict federal standards.
The picture changes considerably with regard to chemical precur-
sors. Many of the substances that might be used to make a chemical
weapon are environmentally regulated under the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA); the EPA Administrator has authority to prohibit
the manufacturing, processing, or distribution in commerce of sub-
stances that present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment.3" Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA), the EPA has comprehensive regulatory authority
over many of the substances that could be used to make chemical weap-
ons." Primarily, these environmental statutes regulate the introduction
of potentially harmful chemicals into the marketplace; a license is re-
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1994). The Administrator may also regulate the production of
such substances, require that records be maintained, regulate chemical use and distribution,
require that manufacturers or processors give notice of risks of injury, and recommend qual-
ity control measures. Id.
31. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994).
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quired, without which marketing is prohibited. For these statutory pow-
ers to apply to all chemical weapons agents and serve all relevant
purposes, the EPA must regulate those chemicals for anti-terrorism as
well as environmental purposes. These environmental laws do not, per
se, prohibit the production of these chemicals.
With enactment in December 1998 of the Chemical Weapons Con-
vention Implementation Act (CWCIA),32 production of chemicals listed
in the Chemical Weapons Convention33 (CWC) is not illegal, although
production over stipulated concentrations and quantities triggers re-
porting obligations, and failure to report or improper reporting is
illegal.34 Unlike most other CWC States Parties, the U.S. has not even
enacted a licensing system for "Schedule 1 chemicals" (the chemical
weapons agents and precursors most strictly regulated under the
CWC).35 The CWCIA does promulgate severe penalties, including the
death penalty, for use of chemical weapons.36 However, the storage of
32. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6701-6771 (1998).
33. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered
into force April 29, 1997). As of January 1999, the CWC has over 170 signatory States.
34. Willful failure or refusal to establish or maintain any required record or to submit
information to the government or to permit access to any record is illegal. Violators may be
required to pay a civil penalty up to $5,000 for each violation. Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion Implementation Act [CWCIA] § 501 (a)(1)(B). Anyone knowingly violating these
requirements shall also be criminally fined or imprisoned up to one year, or both. CWCIA
§ 501(b).
35. The lethal Schedule 1 chemicals that'present the greatest risk to the CWC's object
and purpose may be produced only in limited quantities at specific types of facilities. States
Parties may produce Schedule 1 chemicals at only two types of facilities: at a single "small-
scale" facility "approved by the State Party" and at "other facilities" that produce only a
limited quantity of Schedule 1 chemicals and for only limited purposes. "Production of
Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year may be carried
out for protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-scale facility." CWC Verifi-
cation Annex, pt. VI, (C)(8), (10). Protective purposes are "those purposes directly related to
protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons." Id. at Art.
II, I 9(b). In addition, at facilities approved by the State Party, "[p]roduction of Schedule 1
chemicals in quantities of more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, medical
or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small scale facility in aggregate quantities not
exceeding 10 kg per year per facility." Finally, "[s]ynthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for
research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be car-
ried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility." CWC
Verification Annex, pt. VI, (C)(11)-(12). "Each State Party, during production.., shall
assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environ-
ment." Further, "[e]ach State Party shall conduct such production in accordance with its
national standards for safety and emissions." Id. at pt VI, (C)(7).
36. The CWCIA adds a new Chapter 11B-Chemical Weapons to Title 18 of the United
States Code. It is now unlawful to knowingly "develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer
directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any
chemical weapon" or assist or induce anyone else or attempt or conspire to do so. 18
U.S.C.A § 229(a) (1998). A violator will be fined, imprisoned for any term of years, or both;
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chemicals is regulated only to the extent of preventing environmentally-
threatening releases; security against theft is a matter left to each
chemical firm. Sale of hazardous chemicals may come within the scope
of various environmental laws and under the CWCIA must be reported,
but it is not illegal to sell weapons agents to an unlicensed party. Inter-
state transport of many chemicals is regulated, but this regulation is not
designed to detect movement for terrorist purposes nor are reporting
obligations sufficiently comprehensive to trigger law enforcement.37
The regulatory system for chemicals is positively encyclopedic
when compared to the system that controls deadly biological agents.
Under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, as amended
in 1996,38 use of biological agents to kill or injure is criminalized;
knowing possession, transfer, or acquisition of biological agents for use
as a weapon is also criminalized. 9 Biological agents are defined broadly
to encompass any micro-organism, virus, infectious substance, or bio-
logical product, whether created as a result of biotechnology or isolated
from nature. Biological agents are also defined as capable of causing:
(a) death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human, an ani-
mal, a plant, or another living organism; (b) deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or material of any kind; or (c) deleterious altera-
tion of the environment.40
if someone dies due to such culpable conduct, the violator will be punished by death or life
imprisonment. Also, civil penalties of up to $100,000 per violation may be imposed, and the
violator must reimburse the United States for any expenses incurred incident to seizing,
transporting, or destroying any property. Id. § 229A. Anyone lawfully authorized to deal
with chemical weapons pending their destruction or who tries to destroy or seize a chemical
weapon in an emergency situation is not thereby culpable. Id. § 229 (b).
37. 49 U.S.C.A. § 5103 assigns regulatory authority to define and supervise interstate
transport of hazardous materials (including biological and chemical materials). 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 5301 (1996). For a list of the chemicals/agents that are so regulated, see 49 C.F.R.
§ 172.101 (1998). For a description of marking requirements for non-bulk transport of haz-
ardous materials, see 49 C.F.R. § 172.301 (1998).
38. 18 U.S.C.A. § 175 (1996). The purpose of this Act is to implement the Biological
Weapons Convention and to protect the United States against the threat of biological terror-
ism.
39. In U.S v. Baker, 98 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 1996), rehearing and rehearing en banc de-
nied, cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1456, 137 L.Ed.2d 561, the Eight Circuit defined knowledge:
Evidence sustained conviction for knowing possession of ricin, a toxin, for use as a
weapon, notwithstanding defendant's statements that he intended to use ricin to kill garden
pests and that he did not know who had given it to him; ricin was shown to be extremely
toxic, deadly in extremely small quantities, and very difficult to detect, with no known anti-
dote, and to have been popularized as a method of killing people; handwritten note addressed
to defendant and found inside coffee can with ricin contained information about dangerous-
ness of contents and precautions to be used in handling it; and defendant admitted to Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that he knew that ricin was dangerous and had to be handled
with extreme care.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 178 (1) (A) & (B) (1994).
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The statute does not define what constitutes "for use as a weapon,"
but specifies the alternative. Development, production, transfer, acqui-
sition, retention, or possession of any biological agent, toxin, or delivery
system for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purpose is legal.'
The evidentiary showing required to establish that possession is indeed
for such legal purposes is unclear and raises difficult legal issues, espe-
cially if the suspect is apprehended prior to use. Furthermore,
individuals may escape liability if they can show that they were devel-
oping antidotes/antibodies against the very organisms they might
employ in attack. More significantly, there is a substantially unrestricted
market for biological agents so long as it cannot be shown that those
agents had no apparent justification for legitimate uses.
No license is needed to obtain many of the agents that have been
identified as having ready weapons capabilities. Use of biological mate-
rials on humans as well as standards for protection in research facilities
are regulated as are packaging standards. 2 Yet, regulation of storage
systems is limited to protection against public health-jeopardizing re-
leases and is enforced by OSHA;4 3 protection against theft or diversion
is wholly ignored. Distribution and transportation of biological agents
are astoundingly unregulated; many deadly biological agents can be
obtained through the mail. The export of biological agents may only
proceed with a license; export control regulations list nearly every bio-
logical agent that might be used as a weapon and also specify
technology supporting the production of such agents." It is generally
prohibited to license these products to countries identified as sponsoring
State terrorism, including Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan,
and Libya.4 '5 As to other countries, license applications are considered on
a case-by-case basis to determine if permission would contribute to a
chemical or biological weapons capability.46
In short, the most immediate legal reform to reduce the risk of cata-
strophic terrorism is comprehensive and effective regulatory controls to
govern production, acquisition, and possession of relevant materials and
41. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (B) (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C.A. § 262 (1999) provides requirements for labeling, packaging, containers
of biological products, regulated by FDA and HHS.
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.25 (1998) deals with OSHA regulation of clean-up following re-
lease, disposal of toxic agents. 9 CF.R. § 114.4 (1998) deals with labeling and storage
requirements under USDA. 21 C.F.R. § 864.3250 (1998) specifies containment requirements
during transport and storage under HHS.
44. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.2 (1998).
45. See 15 C.F.R. Pt. 742, Supp. 2 (1998).
46. See 15 C.F.R. § 742.2 (1998).
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technologies. 7 Although potentially drastic, proposals should be consid-
ered to regulate the production and domestic trade of materials and
technologies that are essential to catastrophic terrorism. It may be ap-
propriate to institute licensing systems to govern industries that produce
or use chemical or biological agents which can be weaponized. The
costs of such regulation may be weighty and would tend to fall on le-
gitimate commercial enterprises; mechanisms to both minimize and to
spread that burden through sensitive and cooperative policies that affect
the private sector (discussed below) must therefore be considered. At
minimum, new legislation is needed to track the domestic distribution of
chemical and biological agents and to criminalize possession except by
commercial or research entities.
A regulatory system over the production, possession, and use of
catastrophic agents must be braced by a criminal justice system that
strictly punishes offenders. All violations, including but not limited to
actual attacks, should be treated as severe crimes, regardless of where
they originated or the purpose of the attack. The Biological Weapons
Anti-Terrorism Act provides for significant penalties for use, attempt,
threat, or conspiracy to use biological weapons.4 '8 However, current
Sentencing Guidelines do not adequately address the severity of conse-
quential damages arising from mere possession of deadly agents; a
possibility exists of disproportionately light sentences.49 Notably, Larry
Wayne Harris received only 5 months probation for ordering bubonic
plague by mail, after he plead guilty for mail fraud. When he subse-
quently was accused of possession of anthrax, he did not receive jail
time for the offense because all he had was a harmless animal vaccine,
but he later served time for having violated his probation from the bu-
bonic plague." The Sentencing Commission should consider expanding
47. U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Capital
Hill Hearing with Defense Department Personnel, September 3, 1998 (testimony by FBI
director, Louis Freeh).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1998) provides for a fine or for imprisonment for life or any term
of years or both.
49. See Legal Foundations, Adequacy of Criminal Law and Procedure, Report 7 of 12,
Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, (1997) (visited
March 30, 1999);<http://www.pccip.gov/reportindex.html>.
50. Robert Roth, Harris Pleads Guilty, Is Free; Anthrax Case, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
March 25, 1998, at 01A; Anthrax Suspect's Parole Extended, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS
DIGEST, October 15, 1998, at 730 E3. See generally Time to Tighten Bioterrorism Laws;
Criminals Won't Wait Around for Congress to Take Action on Proposed Five-Year Plan,
FULTON CTY. DAILY REPr., July 23, 1998. Earlier this year, the Nevada Senate, where Harris
was arrested, approved a bill making it a felony to use or threaten to use anthrax and other
biological weapons. Sean Whaley, Senate Passes Bill That Would Make Using Biological
Weapons a Felony, LAS VEGAS REV.-JOURNAL, February 13, 1999, at 6B.
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coverage of its Guidelines to better address the implications of posses-
sion of biological and chemical agents.
IV. INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION CONVENTIONS
Ultimately, catastrophic terrorism is a global threat, and counter-
terrorism efforts must be global to have any serious chance of success.
Negotiation of multilateral conventions is therefore essential to establish
standards of behavior as well as cooperative mechanisms to control
deadly agents and investigate potential threats. Unfortunately, current
negotiations are mired in antiquated non-proliferation concepts that are
substantially unresponsive to catastrophic terrorist threats.
Non-proliferation efforts focus on States on the premise that de-
ployment of weapons of mass destruction in military arsenals will lead
to their use in armed conflict with catastrophic consequences. Certainly,
States' deployment of weapons have encouraged adversary States to
deploy similar weapons, fueling arms races. In order to prevent prolif-
eration of catastrophic weapons, critical materials and technologies in
the process of making those weapons (choke points) are identified, and
entities that are involved with those choke points are monitored by im-
posing reporting requirements and, perhaps, on-site inspections to verify
that they are not involved in illicit weapons activities. Since making
weapons for militarily significant purposes demands an enormous
commitment of resources, strict verification of critical materials and
technologies enables international officials to detect military programs.
Verification is not foolproof, but, Iat minimum, the costs of a clan-
destine weapons program become exorbitant. Most States know that
pursuit of a clandestine weapons program entails massive expenditures
and that the probability of detection is high. Detection of a program car-
ries seriously adverse political ramifications of condemnation and
perhaps sanctions. At minimum, an adversary State may respond with a
military buildup of its own. Accordingly, most States refrain from de-
veloping a prohibited weapons capability.
Closely related is the fact that most States do not want a prohibited
weapons capability; the motive to obtain such weapons is driven, in
part, by the perception that their neighbors and adversaries are acquiring
them and will therefore be able to threaten destruction. Verified non-
proliferation commitments serve to break this cycle by providing evi-
dence that other States are fulfilling their obligations and by confirming
that prohibited activities are not taking place. Most States gain confi-
dence that their security does not require catastrophic weapons, and the
incentive to develop them diminishes, thereby further strengthening the
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international prohibitory norm. Even though not 100% effective, non-
proliferation efforts make sense: they enable the international commu-
nity to focus on the handful of proliferating States with the assurance
that nearly all the world is not, in fact, threatening to develop a clandes-
tine capability.5 '
The question that must be asked is whether this non-proliferation
construct applies to the threat of catastrophic terrorism-that is, does it
reduce the risk that sub-national actors will gain the capability to pro-
duce/obtain terror-significant quantities of weapons, and does it pose a
realistic potential for detecting such activity? Non-proliferation verifi-
cation will go far toward proving that legitimate activities are indeed
legitimate, but verification will not do much to uncover illicit cata-
strophic weapons activities undertaken either by a pariah State or a sub-
national criminal organization. Non-proliferation is not built for that
purpose, and therefore will not have that capability. Even under the
most fortuitous circumstances, strengthened international conventions
will enable everyone to know that commercial facilities in the over-
whelming majority of States are definitely not engaged in weapons-
related activities; we will not know, however, about the few isolated and
disguised sites where mass death is concocted.
The capability to make lethal chemical or biological agents is so
ubiquitous that to concentrate verification measures where production
capability is demonstrable verges on the absurd. If lethal agents can be
made virtually anywhere, then why would anyone intending to produce
catastrophic devices make use of a facility that is monitored because of
its sizeable production of biological, pharmaceutical, or chemical
agents? Put simply, if catastrophic agents can be produced anywhere,
what is gained by verifying that legitimate enterprises are not engaged
in illegal activity? That information tells us nothing about where terror-
ists are producing lethal agents clandestinely, which is the most needed
information.
The patently obvious fact is that a group of moderately trained tech-
nicians using commonplace equipment can brew sufficient agents to kill
thousands, and any currently-considered weapons control verification
system will be unaware until the consequences are apparent. Terrorists
or criminals can, without difficulty, gain access to powerful agents of
mass death. If those agents can be put to remunerative or attention-
enhancing use, then a control system to verify that those agents are not
part of States' military capabilities is inapposite.
51. See Barry Kellman, International Consensus and States Non-Parties, in VOLUME
III, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT LAW (Julie Dahlitz, ed., 1996).
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A far-reaching international law enforcement effort is needed to in-
vestigate suspicious activity and apprehend miscreants." Multilateral
negotiations to develop that effort, not re-configuring non-proliferation
modalities, should focus on at least seven objectives.
A. Criminalizing Possession of Weapons Agents
First, handling precursor agents or undertaking activities relevant to
developing a catastrophic terrorist threat should be defined as an inter-
national crime, excepting authorized activities pursuant to a license.
Activity that constitutes an international crime affects world peace and
security or significantly offends the basic values of humanity; accord-
ingly, powerful international law modalities apply to those crimes.
Currently, there is no unified international convention on terrorism.53
Unfortunately, the international legal response to terrorism does not ad-
dress adequately trans-national catastrophic terrorism, and its treatment
as an international crime could be reinforced. There are gaps in cover-
age, and existing modalities of cooperation fall far short of the
integrated international regime that should be established. Nations
should assume a corollary obligation to treat the same behavior as crime
under domestic law. Uniform enactment of clear and strict penalties, the
jurisdictional scope of the law, and the law's application to corporate
conduct could undermine the stability of criminal organizations.
Recently, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Inter-
national Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings making
it an international crime to bomb a public or government place or a
transportation system or an infrastructure facility with the intent to
cause death, injury, or destruction.5 The Convention also criminalizes
attempt, conspiracy, or assistance to others to accomplish a prohibited
52. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on Inter-
national Cooperation for the Prevention, Control and Suppression of International and
Transnational Criminality, 15 NOVA L. REV. 353 (1991).
53. The international legal response to terrorism has been limited to prohibiting terrorist
conduct, preventing preparations for discrete terrorist offenses, and promoting interstate
cooperation in the investigation, extradition and/or prosecution of offenders. See John F.
Murphy, Cooperative International Arrangements: Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism and the
Extradition and Prosecution of Terrorists, in PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM 368-70
(Paul Levanthal & Yonah Alexander eds., 1987).
54. See Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A Le-
gal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 667, 667 (1996).
55. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res.
52/164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 152, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998)
[hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention]. The Convention will enter into force thirty days
after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification. Terrorist Bombing Conven-
tion, art. 22.
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act. Each State Party must criminalize these offenses under its domestic
law; such acts may not be justified "by considerations of a political,
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar na-
ture and are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.
'56
Significantly, each State Party must investigate facts pertaining to al-
leged offenses, and, if appropriate, ensure that person's prosecution or
extradition. 7 Further provisions specify legal assistance requirements,
obligations to extradite, and procedural rights of accused offenders.
Notably, no offense within the meaning of the Convention may be
viewed as a political offense. 8
A group of experts led by Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson ad-
vocates a convention that would make the production of biological
weapons an international crime, prosecutable anywhere. 9 This proposal
marks a significant advance in treatment of catastrophic terrorism, but it
is limited in two important respects: 1) it applies only to biological
weapons terrorism and not the full range of activities that could inflict
catastrophic harm; and 2) it does not specify the full range of legal mo-
dalities that States should adopt to enforce its proscriptions.
B. Preventing Diversion of Weapons Materials
The international community should implement measures to protect
against unlawful diversion of weapons materials. These measures,
similar to those discussed above in the domestic context, should apply
to the storage and transportation of these materials and could entail ex-
tensive reporting obligations whenever such material is sold or moved.
In regard to nuclear materials, the Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Materials 6° obligates each State Party to take appropriate
steps within the framework of its national law to protect nuclear civilian
(but not military) material to minimize the risk of unauthorized removal
or sabotage of nuclear materials. This Convention has substantial gaps
and limitations; 61 more important, no comparable obligations whatso-
ever apply to chemical or biological materials.
56. Id., art. 5.
57. Id., art. 7(2).
58. Id.,art. 11.
59. See Carter, Deutch, & Zelikow, supra note 1, at 80.
60. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 18 I.L.M.
1419 (entered into force Feb. 8, 1987). The treaty is codified in the United States at 18
U.S.C. § 831 (1994) and 22 U.S.C. § 4831 (1994).
61. Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri, Barricading the Nuclear Window-A Legal
Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 667, 701-704, 714-717 (1996).
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C. Coordinating National Police Forces
Perhaps most important, mechanisms should be established to coor-
dinate activities among States' police forces and officials of relevant
agencies. Special computer linkages could afford investigators instant
access to information about suspicious activity in other States. Institu-
tional barriers to rapid communication and cooperation should be
erased; a new trans-national agency or office could be established to
coordinate investigations and responses. Because a State's unilateral
conduct of law enforcement measures within another State would trans-
gress international law and heighten diplomatic tensions, most
governments demand that law enforcement actions be conducted by lo-
cal police authorities. Thus it is crucial to strengthen international police
capabilities pursuant to a convention that regularizes interactions among
police in the field and overcomes the unpredictability and inadequacies
inherent in domestic enforcement techniques.62
D. Controlling and Tracing Transportation Networks
Transportation networks should be strictly controlled with capabili-
ties to follow relevant materials and equipment. Currently, legitimately
produced nuclear, chemical, or biological material that is smuggled or
stolen cannot be traced to a specific source. The inability to trace mate-
rial complicates law enforcement investigations of criminal
organizations responsible for diversion. An international database
should be prepared on catastrophic agents to enable law enforcement
officials to have a common baseline of information.63 If possible, these
agents could be tagged or marked so that they could be traced back to
their source if later uncovered during an investigation.
E. Preventing Trans-border Movement of Catastrophic Agents
Improved border controls and customs enforcement could help
stanch catastrophic terrorism by preventing the movement of dangerous
62. Interpol is regarded as the premier motivator for international police cooperation. It
provides a formal association for police worldwide which helps establish personal relation-
ships vital for speedy cooperation and cutting through red tape. Interpol also helps local
police to stay abreast of new enforcement tools and techniques through internationally dis-
seminated notices. See generally Mary Jo Grotenroch, Interpol's Role in International Law
Enforcement, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 375 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1988).
63. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintains a database on nuclear material,
although tagging systems are not as effective as technology would permit. See generally
Steve Fetter, Nuclear Archeology: Verifying Declarations of Fissile-Material Reduction, 3
Sci. & GLOBAL SECURITY 236 (1993). No analogous systems exist for chemical or biological
agents.
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items and persons from sites where weapons may be produced or ac-
quired to sites where terrorists want to inflict harm. Customs authorities
must have efficient means to communicate with intelligence agencies,
and customs posts must be equipped with adequate detection systems.
Strengthening of the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC) may be one
step toward accomplishing this objective. 6
F. Obligating Mutual Legal Assistance and Cooperation
Underlying all other steps, the international community should im-
pose an obligation on States to enact expedited mutual legal assistance
and penal cooperation among agents and officials in investigations of
suspected terrorist activities and provide evidence for use in subsequent
prosecutions. These laws should formalize evidence sharing procedures
and obviate the cost, inconvenience, and other difficulties of cross-
jurisdictional cooperative investigations. The proposed biological ter-
rorism treaty, mentioned above, obligates States to extradite suspects or
prosecute them, but there is no requirement for the various other mo-
dalities of legal assistance. Currently, a wide variety of treaties apply to
mutual assistance and penal cooperation in different, and sometimes
overlapping, contexts. A unified convention would help rationalize co-
ordination among States. Most important, a convention should clarify
that the political offense exception to extradition must not apply to cata-
strophic terrorists.
6
G. Harmonizing Municipal Legal Regimes
An international convention should establish uniform standards for
a variety of domestic laws. Domestic law enforcement officials should
be authorized to seize miscreants' assets both for use in subsequent
prosecutions and to deter anyone from pursuing terrorist activities for
pecuniary gain. Law enforcement officials should be able to track bank
records and to overcome complex money laundering schemes. 6 In addi-
tion, if there are concerns that government officials have been corrupted
by criminal activities, new laws should be specified for enactment to
64. See David McClean, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 126-27 (1992).
65. See generally Bruce Zagaris, Developments in International Judicial Assistance and
Related Matters, 18 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339 (1990); and William M. Hannay, The
Legislative Approach to the Political Offense Exception, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNA-
TIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 65, at 116.
66. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, National Legislation and Its
Adequacy to Deal with the Various Forms of Organized Transnational Crime; Appropriate




authorize investigations and to punish severely those who have breached
the public trust. Moreover, those responsible for combatting terrorism
activities should be adequately paid to reduce the temptation of corrup-
tion.
V. COOPERATION WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The private sector, which contains many attractive and vulnerable
terrorist targets, must join government counter-terrorism efforts in order
to maximize the success of those efforts. Unquestionably, the interac-
tion of the private and public sectors raises legal issues that must be
carefully resolved. How inclined private enterprises are to cooperate
with the government depends, in part, on whether systems can be de-
vised to share sensitive information in a manner that neither raises
potential liabilities nor risks devaluation of that information.67 If law
reforms are not instituted to obviate relevant concerns, then tactics to
prevent catastrophic terrorism may fall victim to pettier but more im-
mediate misgivings over business interests.
Cooperation among competing enterprises may be helpful in devel-
oping prevention systems and detection technologies that might be
helpful in the fight against catastrophic terrorism. Especially in regard
to the threat of cyber-terrorism, inter-enterprise cooperation and infor-
mation sharing may be necessary as electronic and information systems
link vulnerabilities.68 Since such cooperation could render enterprises
vulnerable to antitrust exposure, statutory exemptions to antitrust liabil-
ity for cooperative counter-terrorism should be considered. Guidance
from the Department of Justice Antitrust Division or the Federal Trade
Commission that clarifies the standards for communicating information
relevant to counter-terrorism could alleviate apprehension among pri-
vate sector entities.
An effective counter-terrorism information sharing program in-
volves dissemination of information back to private interests after it has
been collected and analyzed by the government. Private sector partici-
pants may be reluctant to share sensitive information if there are not
appropriate protection mechanisms to ensure that the information is not
used by competitors, who presumably participate in the same program.
67. See Information-Sharing Models, A "Legal Foundations" Special Study, Report to
the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1997) (visited March 30,
1999);<http://www.pccip.gov/reportindex.html>.
68. See Legal Foundations, Legal Impediments to Information Sharing, Report 10 of 12,
Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, (1997), (visited
March 30, 1999); <http://www.pccip.gov/reportjindex.html>.
Spring 1999]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The same technologies that are used in catastrophic weaponry also have
important commercial applications. The risk that confidential business
information (CBI) might be lost could impede cooperation of relevant
businesses. Without adequate CBI protection, a perilous situation could
develop where a private company would have to choose between ob-
structing counter-terrorism cooperation and losing valuable business
information. 69 Trade secrets are protected by Federal law from theft andunauhoried " 70
unauthorized disclosure. More specific provisions should be consid-
ered to address unique issues concerning relevant counter-terrorism
information and to ensure that appropriate agencies have instituted ade-
quate procedures to prevent diversion or loss.
One specific problem related to trade secret disclosure concerns is
dealt with in 5 U.S.C. § 552.71 This section makes information in the
possession of the federal government available to the public on request.
Potential participants in an information sharing mechanism may require
assurances that their sensitive information will remain confidential de-
spite a FOIA request to obtain that information from the government.
Information need not be disclosed if Congress enacts a specific exemp-
tion for that type of information. To strengthen counter-terrorism
efforts, promulgation of such an exemption may be appropriate.
Different, issues pertain to information sharing with foreign corpo-
rations. Many agencies employ national security guidelines for sharing
sensitive information with foreign corporations, but each agency em-
ploys different criteria for determining what information may not be
shared and for what percentage of foreign ownership is a bar to shar-
72ing. Developing uniform federal guidelines specifically tailored to
counter-terrorism could alleviate unnecessary inter-agency confusion.73
A key sector of private enterprise will be security specialists. These
sensitive duties are being performed by individuals whose qualifica-
tions, methods, and accountability are unregulated. One approach could
be government licensing of private security specialists that would spec-
69. See generally Barry Kellman, et al., Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Con-
trol Verification Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36
HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1995).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1994)(disclosure of confidential information generally).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
72. Executive Order No. 12968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40245 at § 2.6 (1995) provides that classi-
fied information may be disclosed to foreign individuals, governments, or international
organizations where compelling reasons exist in furtherance of agency mission. This must be
done according to carefully defined guidelines. Executive Order No. 12333 provides for
cooperation between the intelligence community and foreign intelligence systems. It makes
no provision for information-sharing between private entities and foreign organizations or
governments. Exec. Order No. 12333, supra note 25.
73. See Legal Impediments to Information Sharing, supra note 71, at Report 10.
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ify qualifications for obtaining a license, levels of insurance required,
standards of practice, and conditions that allow for limited information
sharing. Professional licensing could facilitate responsible growth of the
profession by ensuring that trained, qualified and fully insured person-
nel are available to perform these sensitive duties. Professional
licensing could also accelerate the establishment of much-needed in-
dustry standards and best practices, and can even serve the interests of
privacy by making practitioners more accountable. The licensing body
might also facilitate the passing of relevant information in the interests
of government and private parties, while meeting clients' needs for con-
fidentiality and control over routine investigations.74
The most serious legal issues concerning private sector anti-
terrorism efforts have to do with providing assistance in tracking poten-
tial terrorists by furnishing information about employees to law
enforcement officials. Employees arguably pose the most immediate
and credible threat to the nation's critical infrastructures. While the fed-
eral government guards itself through authority to conduct background
investigations in screening employees for sensitive positions, issue se-
curity clearances, and conduct periodic reinvestigations,75 private
employers who produce critical materials and technologies or who op-
erate critical infrastructures do not have the same authority to screen
applicants for certain highly critical positions, or to re-investigate cur-
rent employees prior to placement in such positions.76
In many states, private employers do not have access to criminal
history information, are prohibited from requesting or using criminal,
financial or employment information, and may incur tort liability for
revealing unfavorable employment history.77 These restrictions result
from legitimate concerns over privacy, fair employment, rehabilita-
tion, and related questions. Existing laws that hinder an employer
from obtaining, with the consent of the applicant or employee, certain
job-related background information may need to be reconsidered in
light of catastrophic concerns. At minimum, measures should be con-
sidered to achieve an appropriate balance between security
74. See Legal Foundations, Studies and Conclusions, Report 1 of 12, Report to the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, (1997) (visited March 30,
1999); <http://www.pccip.gov/reportindex.html>.
75. Civil Service Investigations, Exec. Order No. 10450, codified in the Civil Service
Act of 1883, 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1997).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1994), provides that the employment records of Federal em-
ployees cannot be shared with other employers without the involvement of the employee.
77. See generally Robert Adler & Ellen Pierce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon
Their "No Comment" Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1381 (1996).
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requirements of conducting employee background investigations with
individual employees' interests in personal privacy.78 Broader use could
be made of the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) which
serves as a clearinghouse of information about the criminal records of
prospective employees. 9
A closely-related issue concerns the legality of using polygraphs.
Federal law currently prohibits private employers from requiring or
even asking employees to submit to polygraph examinations except un-
der very narrow and carefully described circumstances involving an
investigation into employee wrongdoing.0 A second narrow exception
exists for employers in certain security professions-so that security
companies, such as those that provide armored car services or alarm
system installation services to specially enumerated businesses, can pe-
riodically polygraph their employees (again, subject to carefully defined
conditions and circumstances). Arguably, the same rationale that mili-
tates in favor of having this exception available for providers of
physical security services should apply with equal force to provides of
information security services. Congress could narrowly expand existing
exemptions to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) to in-
clude within the scope of its exemptions those who are in the business
of providing information security services."
78. See generally Privacy Laws and the Employer-Employee Relationship, A "Legal
Foundations" study, Report 9 of 12, Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infra-
structure Protection (1997), <http://www.pccip.gov/report -index.html>.
79. Under 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1997), the Attorney General is required to establish infor-
mation on the criminal backgrounds of certain persons for purposes of identification. 28
C.F.R. § 20.31 provides that the FBI administer the NCIC. Criminal Justice Information
Systems, 28 C.F.R. § 20.31 (1998). The information can be shared with government agencies
or with employees in sensitive industries. This clearinghouse tends to be very passive, only
disseminating information as it is requested by prospective employers. The clearinghouse is
not capable of alerting the law enforcement community or of monitoring the movements of
criminal suspects. States participate voluntarily in the program, and the FBI makes informa-
tion in the database available to employers who are banks, state and local governments,
registered securities exchanges or nuclear power providers. States are free to create their
own clearinghouses if they choose not to participate in the NCIC. See generally 28 C.F.R.
§ 20.1-20.38 (1998).
80. The Employee Polygraph Protection Chapter, 29 U.S.C. § 2001.
81. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1998). These exemptions include all government employ-
ees as well as various DOD, DOE, intelligence community and FBI contractors and their
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2006e (1998). Another exception applies to employers who provide
physical security-related services for protection of facilities having a significant impact on
health of safety, including electric power plants, public water supply systems, public trans-
portation, and protection of currency, securities, commodities, or proprietary information. 29
U.S.C. § 2006(e)(1) (1998). Chemical companies, producers and handlers of biological





Catastrophic terrorist threats have received far more attention than
have the legal rules that are appropriate to a response. This suggests ei-
ther that officials planning responses to terrorism are callous about
those responses' legal implications or that answers are being formulated
without overt public discussion involving the larger legal community. In
either event, the very real risks of catastrophic terrorism are being com-
pounded, unnecessarily, by the risk that a crisis will evoke an inefficient
and/or repressive reaction.
Official supervisory authority is vested in the National Security
Council, conferring an unprecedented administrative role for a policy
advisory arm of the White House. The benefits of coordination are sig-
nificant, and the risks of over-reaching may not be currently probable.
Yet, the absence of legal safeguards should be addressed lest a prece-
dent of NSC involvement in domestic law enforcement become
customary. Somewhat related is the lack of defined rules applying to
military roles, both in preventing catastrophic terrorism and responding
to an event. The military has important expertise to contribute to
counter-terrorism, and a truly catastrophic event might rent the social
fabric sufficiently to welcome disciplined troops. But it would seem
cavalier to be wholly quiescent about the possibility of an NSC, limited
only by the President, exercising supervising authority over troops de-
ployed in the United States. As these concerns can be appropriately
addressed through overt adoption of policies specifying the roles of
various agencies, including accountability processes, the prolonged ab-
sence of such policies tends to energize apprehension.
Materials and technologies relevant to production of biological and
chemical agents that pose catastrophic dangers are inadequately regu-
lated. For historical reasons, these substances are easily obtained,
produced, and traded, and legal accountability for activity short of ac-
tual use is scant. The law's treatment of nuclear materials provides a
dramatic contrast, and Congress should consider adopting analogous
licensing and monitoring systems for other precursor substances. Inter-
nationally, biological and chemical weapons capabilities are even less
restricted. But instead of developing sophisticated law enforcement mo-
dalities to stanch the production and trade of these capabilities, the
international community is focusing verification techniques on com-
mercial sectors as if the primary threat came from States in a military
context. There should be discussion, domestically and internationally,
about intelligence sharing, cooperative policing, transportation and bor-
ders controls, and uniform criminalization. Ignoring the need for
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international collaboration is smug isolationism; diverting attention in
traditional non-proliferation directions is to turn a blind eye to the fact
that the threats have changed. Answers that avoid the need for enhanced
law enforcement are folly.
Amidst all these issues is a concern for civil liberties: can we have
our security and our autonomy too? The importance of harmonizing
public needs with private rights is underlined by the imperative of en-
gaging the private sector in counter-terrorism measures. Threats of
antitrust charges or losses of confidential information will alienate the
private enterprises whose participation is most critical. Security spe-
cialists, who will be the first line of defense, should be held to modest
standards; a licensing system may be appropriate. Most challenging will
be the task of balancing personal privacy rights with the need to know
background information about employees who have access to critical
materials, equipment, or infrastructure.
None of these issues is beyond straightforward resolution which
makes the paucity of that resolution all the more troubling and, at worst
feeds suspicions that rights are being infringed. The legal community,
by overtly addressing these issues, can thus serve a dual purpose: by
balancing competing interests and enacting those balances into law; and
by expounding, in public view, that catastrophic terrorism's threat will
neither be ignored nor made a justification for magnification of gov-
ernment restraints on our liberties. There is much constructive work to
be done and, perhaps, so little time.
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